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by
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ANY GENERAL history of psychiatry between, say, the Renaissance and the end of
the nineteenth century would likely stress, among other things, the following two
points. First, that during this period there was a growing acceptance, both within
the medical community and among the general public, that certain behavioural
patterns, and certain kinds of mental states, are the result of disease, and hence are
the proper objects ofmedical description and treatment; this instead ofthe ascription
ofthese queerways ofacting orthinking to suchthings as thepossession bydaemons,
a state of sin or wilful criminality. Second, a growing acceptance, again among both
physicians and laymen, that the mind is the function of the brain, that a phrase like
"mental physiology" is not a contradiction in terms, and that while perhaps it is
not equivalent to "cerebral physiology" the two processes are so closely linked that
the one cannot be properly understood without reference to the other. This com-
mitment received its fullest expression in the school of German somatic psychiatrists
of the last half of the nineteenth century, the school of Griesinger, Meynert and
Wernicke, a group that Ackerknecht has called the "brain psychiatrists".'
My end point for the above broad summary was the end ofthe nineteenth century.
This was deliberate, for despite the fact that in a general way these two trends have
continued to the present day, implicit or explicit challenges to both claims still exist.
For example, what might be called the "educational process" among laymen con-
tinues unabated: they are told that "mental illness is nothing to be ashamed of", or
that "mental illness is just like any other illness". At the same time, within the
psychiatric community itself, the whole concept ofmental health and mental illness
as it is presently formulated has been severely criticized, from the political left by
psychiatrists such as R. D. Laing; while from another vantage point, much more to
the right, Thomas Szasz has raised doubts about the "scientific" status ofpsychiatry,
has suggested that our whole notion of "mental illness" is essentially a fiction, and
that psychiatrists, instead of being scientific physicians, are actually custodians and
public servants, charged with the care of people whom society for various reasons
finds intolerable. In some of their roles at least, psychiatrists are thus placed by
Szasz in roughly the position of a gaoler or poorhouse attendant in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, when "lunatics" or "madmen" were identified by law as
a species of vagrant whose liberties had to be curtailed in the interest of the safety
or convenience of society at large.2
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The second line of development mentioned above, the gradual theoretical shift in
thinking about insanity from categories ofmind to categories ofbrain, has also been
rechannelled in the twentieth century, and this largely of course because of Freud.
It is ironic that Freud was the product ofGerman brain psychiatry and that he never
lost his belief that mental processes, conscious and unconscious, are completely
correlated with physiological changes in the human body. He recognized, however,
thattheneurophysiologyofhisdaywasinadequatetoprovideanaccountofpsychiatric
diseases in neurophysiological terms.8 His therapeutic measures, notably psycho-
analysis, were developed with little reference to his physicalist commitment. Freud
adopted a metaphorical language which allowed him to speak about mental pheno-
mena without being simultaneously required to spell out theirphysiological correlates
which he fully believed would be specified in the course of time. The same position
has provided other psychiatrists the licence to talk as ifpsychiatric development were
independent of neurological development. It was Freud's influence more than any-
thing else which formalized the separation of psychiatry from neurology. At a time
when evolutionary biology has undermined the ontological position of the human
mind, we still live more or less in a Cartesian world. We recognize diseases of the
brain and diseases of the mind, and if the border between is not quite so clear as it
might be in the world which Descartes constructed, the number of patients which
psychiatrists and neurologists fight over is on the whole rather small. Both ofthese
problems, then, the status of mental disease and the relationship of mental function
to brain anatomy and physiology, are still unresolved, which perhaps enables us
to appreciate more easily some of the peculiarities which have attended the past
theory and practice of psychiatry. I shall here be concerned with aspects of these
two problems as they relate to the theoretical and practical implications of moral
therapy in Britishpsychiatry ofthelast decades ofthe eighteenth and thefirstdecades
ofthe nineteenth centuries.
I
The development of "moral therapy", as it was frequently called at the time, is
of course one of the high points in the history of psychiatry. Although the myth
that Pinel struck off all the chains of his patients in one dramatic gesture has been
punctured; and although recent research has shown that others besides Pinel were
at the time actively engaged in the same kinds of therapeutic experiments, both the
drama and the importance of the movement are still recognized in the historical
literature. "Moral therapy" was simultaneously a triumph of humanism and of
therapy, a recognition that kindness, reason, and tactful manipulation were more
effective in dealing with the inmates ofasylums than were fear, brutal coercion and
restraint, and medical therapy.4 It is this last parameter, medical therapy, with which
I shall be particularly concerned.
"Broadly constructed, 'moral treatment' included all nonmedical techniques, but
more specifically it referred to therapeutic efforts which affected the patient's
psychology."5 This definition of Carlson and Dain adequately reflects the kinds of
differences which early nineteenth-century advocates of moral therapy saw between
their own approaches and the therapeutic programmes of previous generations.
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Nevertheless, coercion and restraint can operatepsychologicallyjustas can libertyand
non-restraint. Benjamin Rush with his restraining chair, and Erasmus Darwin with
his rotating chair, were presumably just as well intentioned as Pinel or any other
advocate of moral therapy. And if these rather brutal eighteenth-century methods
"cured" as their inventors claimed they did, we may assume that these cures were
"psychological" in precisely the same way as those attained by moral treatment. The
modus operandi in both cases was via the patient's mind. The moral therapy ofnine-
teenth-century psychiatrists was admittedly different from the harsher approaches
oftheir earlier colleagues, but much ofthe change stemmed from the attitudes ofthe
doctors themselves rather than from some entirely new appeal to the patient's
psychology.
Nevertheless, if the virtual equation of "moral" with "psychological" blurs some
ofthe distinctions between Pinel's therapeutic endeavours and what went before, the
connotations of the phrase "moral therapy" are sufficiently precise to justify its use
in describing the reform in psychiatric treatment associatedwith Pinel, Tuke, and the
other late eighteenth-century activists. In fact, the prehistory of the concept of
moral therapy appears quite meagre. One can assume that many earlier physicians
were tactful enough, humane enough, and perceptive enough to deal with mentally
disturbed patients in the quiet, efficient manner which seems to have been the norm
at the famous York Retreat, founded by the Quaker philanthropist William Tuke
in 1792. Part of the reason for the absence of more objective evidence on this point
in the earlier medical literature might be attributed to the lack of many detailed
case histories. Obviously the conditions of the York Retreat never obtained at the
large public institutions like Bethlem, but physicians dealing with private, individual,
and paying patients perhaps used different tactics. Perhaps they did, but the
evidence is hardly overwhelming. And when we consider the therapy which was
meted out for the most famous patient ofhis day, King George III, we can appreciate
the real contrast which moral therapy presented. A great deal was at stake with this
patient, and there is every reason to believe that Francis Willis, his sons, and other
assistants treated the king in a manner which (in Willis's considered opinion) would
most likely result in the royal patient's recovery. Yet, as the Countess Harcourt
described the situation, "The unhappy patient ... was no longer treated as a human
being. His body was immediately encased in a machine which left it no liberty of
motion. He was sometimes chained to a stake. He was frequently beaten and starved,
and at best he was kept in subjection by menacing and violent language."6 He was in
addition blistered, bled, and given digitalis, tartar emetic, and various other drugs.
The intimidations and threats technically come under the rubric ofmoral therapy,
in the sense that it was his mind which was being appealed to. Perhaps "immoral
therapy" is a better description ofthis approach, but in any case I am less concerned
with that than with the blisters, bleeding, digitalis, tartar emetic and other therapeutic
measures. In point offact, physicians at the time generally decided that George was
labouring under a "delirium" instead of a madness.7 But that little matters, since he
was treated by "mad doctors" (i.e. broadly speaking, psychiatrists), and the methods
they used with him were not out of the ordinary.
One reason that medical treatment for madness might seem odd is the fact that
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eighteenth-century theories of mind took far less cognizance of the brain than ours
do. Their universe was more nearly Cartesian than ours in their separation ofmind
from brain, and, more important, their conflation of the philosophical and medical
concept of mind with the theological concept of soul. This conflation can be seen
even in David Hartley's physical model of the mind. Hartley's 1749 Observations on
man, hisframe, his duty, and his expectations developed an association psychology
based on a psychophysical parallelism whereby all mental events have their physical
representations in the vibrations of fibres in the brain. Hartley, a devout Christian,
introduced a scholium making it against the rules to deduce the materiality of the
soul from his physical model ofthe mind.8 It is worth noting that in the first volume
of Hartley's work (in which he developed his psychology) the word soul occurs only
in the context of the scholium. The rest of the book is about mind, but the wording
ofthe scholium demonstrates that the two concepts were identical for him. They had
been of course for Descartes as well; indeed, the French use the single word l'dme
for both. It was the possession of an immaterial soul which distinguished man from
the animals, theologically, of course, but psychologically as well. Descartes' strict
dualism created a number of philosophical problems; but these were compounded
when the same framework was used to talk about mental disease. If it is the soul
which gives man his reason, is it this same theological soul which is diseased in
those individuals who have either lost their reason, or never developed any? The
kinds of compromise a physician working within what was essentially a Cartesian
framework had to make may be seen in the writings of'ThomasWillis. Willis modified
the Cartesian picture somewhat in adopting Gassendi's notion that there exist two
kinds of soul: sensitive soulswhich are material andwhichman shareswith animals;
and rational souls, immaterial and the possession of man alone. Willis conceived
madness to be a disease ofthe rational soul; but since he also believed in the pristine
inviolability of the rational soul, he postulated that in order to function properly,
the rational soul is absolutely dependent on thephantasie, an attribute ofthe sensitive
soul, possessed by animals and located by Willis in the corpus callosum. Thus Willis
could talk about mental disease only by making the rational soul so dependent on the
brain that, to modern eyes at least, his distinction between the two kinds of soul
becomes for all practical purposes meaningless.9
The problem of insanity in the medical literature before the nineteenth century is
further complicated by the almost exclusive emphasis on disturbances of reason, or
the highest intellectual faculties ofman. Insanity was conceived as a derangement of
those very faculties which were widely assumed to be unique to man; as a matter of
fact, we sometimes find in the literature the presumed absence in animals of any
condition analogous to insanity taken as proof that man's highest psychological
functions result from some principle totally lacking in otheranimals, that is, the soul.
On the surface then, Willis' position seems odd, for he recommends the almost
exclusive use of medical therapy to treat a disease the manifestations of which are a
malfunctioning of a faculty, reason, which itself results from the operation of an
immaterial principle. How, in a Cartesian universe, can physicians cure mental
diseases by physical remedies? The answer of course is that they don't; they protect
the soul, locate the disease in the brain, humours, or elsewhere in the body, and
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treat that instead. And as long as one conflates the concepts ofmind and soul, mental
disease is either a misnomer and actually brain disease indirectly affecting mental
functions; or a visitation from the devil or the Deity, i.e. possession or retribution.
Seen from this perspective, some ofJ. C. A. Heinroth's rhapsodies make more sense.'0
More common however was the opposite position, namely that the soul or mind is
never primarily deranged. Late in the nineteenth century solid American psychiatrists
such as John Gray and Pliny Earle were physicalists in order to protect the soul.
Gray wrote in 1885 that insanity is "simply a bodily disease in which the mind is
disturbed more or less profoundly, because the brain is involved in the sickness either
primarily or secondarily. The mind is not, in itself, ever diseased. It is incapable of
disease or ofits final consequence death."'"
Thistheologicalmotivethusfurnished onereasonwhyaphysicianofthe seventeenth
or eighteenth centuries would not find medical therapy for mental disease odd.
Another aspectwhich I shall notdiscuss isperhaps more obvious: this was the general
inheritance of the humoralism of Greek physiology, pathology, and therapy. On
one level atleast, humoralism accounted for mental diseases theoretically and dictated
the appropriate medical therapy. It provided a traditional rationale for medical
therapy, and both of these factors, the theological and the humoral, should be kept
in mind when evaluating the reactions of British physicians to moral therapy.'2
Another factor was more obviously social and economic. Work by historians such
as Foucault, Ackerknecht, Rosen, and others has pointed to the profound changes
in social attitudes towards insanity between the sixteenth and nineteenth centuries.'3
Despite the fact that physicians had frequently been concerned with what might be
called the disease concept of insanity, the care, or custody at least, of the insane
was less frequently in their hands. England's 1744 Vagrancy Act is instructive here.
Section 20 of the Act dealt with "those who by lunacy or otherwise are so far dis-
ordered in their Senses that they may be dangerous to be permitted to go Abroad."
Any person could detain such a vagrant, and the consent oftwojustices ofthe peace
was adequate to "cause such Persons to be apprehended and kept safely locked up
in some secure place". No medical certificate was necessary and the decision about
ultimate release was in the hands ofeither the gaoler or the local magistrates.'4 This
was how the 1744 Act left the situation, but during the next half-century or so several
significant changes occurred. The medical community began to assume an increased
responsibility for the care of the insane, and this phenomenon is reflected in various
institutions, in various acts ofparliament, and in a growing medical literature on the
subject. The institutions include St. Luke's Hospital, London, founded in 1751,. the
Manchester Lunatic Hospital (1766), and the Newcastle Lunatic Hospital (1767).
St. Luke's was conceived by its founders as a rival to Bethlem, and while conditions
apparently left something to be desired, they were a decided improvement over those
at Bethlem. The physician to the new hospital was of course William Battie, whose
1758 pamphlet On madness was construed by John Monro, physician to Bethlem,
as an attack on the latter's father. Their debate need not concern us here.'5
This same period also saw the growth in the number of "private madhouses",
about which Dr. Parry-Jones has recently written.'6 These private establishments
(run by individual entrepreneurs for a profit) have been a feature of English life for
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several centuries, but in fact their relation to the medical profession itself remained
unclear during the eighteenth century. Anyone could open a private madhouse, i.e.
receive lunatics in his house on a paying basis. Many, and perhaps even most, of
these proprietors were medical men, but there was nothing which required them to
be, and tacit in the lack of legal regulation was the implication that either (a) their
function was custodial rather than therapeutic; or (b) anyone could select and
administer the therapy indicated by insanity. The first act aimed at licensing these
establishments was passed in 1774. It said nothing about the medical qualifications
of the proprietors, keepers, owner, or consultants; but the act did recognize medical
jurisdiction in cases of insanity in two ways. First, it set up a commission to inspect
private madhouses within the metropolitan area, and this commission was composed
ofmembers appointed by the Royal College ofPhysicians. Second, it required that a
medical certificate be obtained before a person could be committed to such an
establishment.17 Beforethelicensingacts ofthe nineteenthcentury betterdefiningwho
in fact was a "medical man" this second part of the act was of uncertain practical
importance.18 Nevertheless the social significance ofthis act lay in its recognition that
insanity was a medical issue, rather than, as implied in 1744, a condition which any
person could recognize and which any magistrate could formalize.
By the end of the eighteenth century, then, British physicians were playing an in-
creasing role, legal and practical, in the diagnosis and therapy of the insane. A large
number of medical works dealing with insanity appeared during the last decades of
that century, partly the result ofthe wide interest aroused by George III's illness; but
also the reflection of those more general considerations mentioned above. The best
known of these works include Thomas Arnold's Observations on the nature, kinds,
causes, and prevention of insanity (1782-86); sections of John Ferriar's Medical
histories and reflections (1792-98); William Pargeter's Observations on maniacal
disorders (1792); Alexander Crichton's Inquiry into the nature and origin of mental
derangement (1798); Andrew Harper's Treatise on insanity (1789); and John Haslam's
Observations on insanity (1798).
This growing medical interest in and control over the insane was to some extent
challenged by the spread ofmoral therapy. From the beginning British commentators
identified the emphasis on moral therapy as one of the striking characteristics of
Pinel's 1801 Traits sur l'aliknation. His English translator David Daniel Davis (1777-
1841) noted in his introduction to the 1806 translation that "this volume is chiefly
valuable for the great attention to the principles of the moral treatment of insanity
which it recommends"'9' Pinel was not the first to stress psychological factors in the
causation ofinsanity. Indeed, he himself referred to earlier writers on this point, for
example, to Alexander Crichton's consideration of the passions in the generation of
what Crichton called mental derangement. Pinel, however, explicitly completed the
circle: that which is psychologically caused is most effectively psychologically treated.
Therelationship between causation and treatment is atwo-wayaffair,for "the success-
ful application of moral regimen exclusively, gives great weight to the supposition,
that, in a majority of instances, there is no organic lesion of the brain nor of the
cranium."20 For Pinel, insanity was a mental condition, hence logically treated by
psychological methods. Such was his success with moral therapy that he completely
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abandoned medical therapy on most of his patients, giving them a trial of moral
therapy and resorting to medicinal (physical) remedies only with those on whom the
psychological measures had failed.
Pinel's programme achieved impressive results which he thoroughly substantiated
in his treatise. Nevertheless, it raised several questions. What, for instance, was the
role of the physician to be? The successful application of moral therapy required
most of all a willing and sensitive staff, and Pinel's case histories were filled with
patient-keeper interactions; much less frequently did he record direct interaction
with himself. He further mentioned the "common sense and unprejudiced observa-
tion" on which his work was based; again, Pinel paid warm tribute to the principal
keeper of the asylum, from whom he had obviously derived a great deal.
The same kinds ofquestions were implicit in the history and structure ofthe York
Retreat. The Retreat, as it was affectionately known, was founded in 1792, but it
was not until 1813 and the years following that its methods were widely discussed.
Samuel Tuke's Description ofthe Retreat was published in 1813, and Sydney Smith
eulogized Tuke's book and the institution it described in the Edinburgh Review, one
ofthe leading periodicals ofthe day.21 The Retreat had a ready foil, forTuke's work
emerged from the controversy surrounding the alleged mismanagement of the other
York institution for the insane, the York Asylum. Whereas the Retreat was founded
and largely run by laymen, the York Asylum was easily recognized as a typical
medical concern presided over by a physician, Dr. Charles Best. Public attention
continued to be focused on the condition ofthe insane during these years through the
hearings of a parliamentary select committee concerned with the "better regulation
of madhouses" in 1815 and 1816. The committee accumulated and published some
600 pages of evidence which according to the Edinburgh Review, contained "beyond
all question, the most important body of information, that has ever appeared, upon
the subject of Insanity."22 Such was the public esteem accorded to the ideals of the
founders of the Retreat that Edward Wakefield in 1815 could think of no higher
praise for the private madhouse of Mr. Finch at Laverstock than by remarking, "In
this establishment I saw all that Tuke has written realized".23 After a visit to the
Retreat in 1812, Dr. Andrew Duncan had asserted "that the Retreat at York, is at
this moment the best-regulated establishment in Europe, either for the recovery of
the insane, or for their comfort, when they are in an incurable state."24
Tuke's Description was hardly polemical in tone; yet the work contained a rather
damning attack on the medical profession's capacity to deal with mental illness.
Samuel Tuke was not a physician. In fact, he had wanted to become one, and quite
naturally to specialize in the treatment ofmental disorders. Family pressure kept him
in the family business. Nevertheless, we can presume that Samuel did not possess his
grandfather William Tuke's general aversion to the medical profession.25 It is clear
from the Description that the experience of the Retreat had convinced Samuel Tuke
of the decided superiority of moral over medical therapy.
From the beginning the Retreat was provided with the usual visiting physician.
Kindness and the various trappings of moral therapy were always the aims of the
Retreat, but Tuke insisted that the minimization of medical therapy was not built
into the institutional structure; it had merely evolved from careful observation. Only
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gradually had the Retreat's firstphysician, Thomas Fowler, abandoned the "bleeding,
blister, setons, evacuants, and many other prescriptions, which have been highly
recommended by writers on insanity".26 Fowler was no general therapeutic nihilist;
his three major publications all concern therapy and he compounded and gave his
name to the arsenical solution which was so popular in the nineteenth century and
which in Britain still has its devotees.27 Like Pinel's, Fowler's was the therapeutic
scepticism of a physician who had simply explained his therapy carefully. As Tuke
summarized it, Fowler "plainly perceived how much was to be done by moral, and
how little by any known medical means".
At the Retreat, like the Bicetre, the physician was a shadowy figure, the burden of
therapeutic responsibility having fallen on the keepers and other staff whose per-
sonal contacts with the patient were much greater than that of the physician. Tuke
never proposed to abolish the office ofphysician to the Retreat. Indeed, he suggested
that the physician could be a very important figure: "The physician, from his office,
sometimes possesses more influence over the patients' minds than the other atten-
dants". The phrase "the other attendants" is telling; it suggests that very little of
thephysician's role was dictated byhis specific medical training, a great deal by simple
benevolence and common sense.
The success ofmoral therapy thus threatened to change the rather newly established
place ofthe medical man in the treatment ofinsanity; and, as we have seen, theories
ofinsanity were also at stake. Pinel was explicit indrawing out the theoretical implica-
tions of moral therapy, in seeing mental disease as frequently a functional condition
unaccompanied by structural changes. However, Pinel'sworkwas somewhatconfused
by his emphasis on the epigastrium in the origin of many attacks of insanity.28
Samuel Tuke on the other hand refused to commit himself on the ultimate nature of
insanity, but he recognized the problem in the terms outlined above: "If", he wrote,
"we adopt the opinion, that the disease originates in the mind, applications made
immediately to it, are obviously the most natural, and the most likely to be attended
with success. If, on the contrary, we conceive that mind is incapable of injury or de-
struction, and that, in all cases ofapparent mental derangement, some bodilydisease,
though unknown, really exists, we shall still readily admit, from the reciprocal action
ofthe twoparts ofour systemupon eachother, thatthe greatest attention isnecessary,
towhateveris calculated to effectthe mind." Tuke's attitudewasessentiallypragmatic;
itwasenough forhimthat moraltherapy waseffective, whateverthe reason.
Moral therapy, then, was hardly a straightforward affair; and its implications for
both medical theory and medical practice were not lost on the physicians ofthe early
nineteenth century who attempted to assess its true significance. However much they
might profess to admire the methods of Pinel or the Tukes, very few were prepared
to abandon entirely the medical treatment ofinsanity. When William Tuke had been
asked by the parliamentary committee of the effect of medicine in cases of mental
derangement, the venerable old man had replied: "In cases of mental derangement,
from what I have learnt, it is thought very little can be done; but when the mental
disorder is accompanied by bodily disease of one kind or other, the removal of the
complaint has frequently recovered the patient; this comes within my personal ob-
servation, having frequently enquired into the effect of medical treatment."29
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Ifphysicians qua physician could do nothing for the lunatic except treat his bodily
afflictions, then the medical man had no special claim to a unique place in the treat-
mentofmentalillness. Theirincome,prestige,andmedical theorieswere all threatened.
So, in some instances at least, was their integrity, for many of the abuses which the
parliamentary committee had called to notice involved medical men.
It is not surprising,then,thatwe findacertaindefensiveness in the Britishpsychiatric
literature of the 1810s and 1820s. For the doctor at least, the rise of moral therapy
was not an unmixed blessing.
II
The Parliamentary Select Committee whichin 1815 and 1816 examined the manage-
ment of various institutions responsible for the care of the insane was not actively
hostile to the medical profession. The committee was particularly concemed with
improving the quality of care available for the lunatic in both public and private
institutions, and the hearings focused on several specific instances of brutality and
neglect which had come to light in the immediate past. William Norris for instance
had spent the last ten orfifteen years ofhis lifechained in a damp cold cell in Bethlem,
no-one remembering precisely how long it had been. The committee repeatedly
queried the practice of keeping violent or incontinent patients naked and chained,
and the odd pregnancy of a female patient or the sudden death of an inmate under
mysterious circumstances kept the discourse at a dramatic level. Bethlem and the
York Asylum fared badly at the hearings and the scandals which came out of these
institutions put the medical men who controlled them on the defensive. Even the
printed transcripts convey the tight-lipped resentment with which Thomas Monro,
John Haslam, and Charles Best answered many ofthe questions put to them during
the proceedings.
The committee for instance was anxious to determine how frequently Monro
visited Bethlem in his capacity as sole physician to the hospital. On 8 May 1815
Bethlem's steward George Wallet expressed his opinion that Monro attended "but
seldom; . . . I hear he has not been round the house but once these three months;
he may have been there without my knowledge, he has been at the Hospital more
frequently, but not round the gallery [where the patients generally stayed]."30 Four
days later Haslam informed the committee that Monro visited the hospital "twice a
week, Saturday and Wednesday, or Tuesday; he suits his convenience". A week
later Monro himself put the figure at "About three times a week"..3'
Patient neglect was of course not a medical monopoly, and one group of mad-
houses also at fault were those at Hoxton owned by Sir Jonathan Miles. Miles
himselfwasnotaphysician, andwhileeachofhismadhouseshad aregularapothecary,
the official limit of the apothecary's responsibility ended with the patients' bodily
complaints. Should the patient or his family be concemed about the mental disorder,
an outsidephysician had to be specifically engaged to visit the patient on a consultant
basis.32 That no medical treatment was routinely provided for the psychiatric
complaints was obviously viewed by the committee as an abuse. Nevertheless, one of
the questions frequently put to the various witnesses concemed just that issue.
John Latham, President of the Royal College of Physicians, was asked point-blank,
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"Are you of opinion that ifmedicines were occasionally administered to patients for
insanity only, it would be productive ofany chance ofrecovery?" Latham answered,
"I think it is probable it would."83 This is the response that a physician might be
expected to make and Latham's opinion was substantiated by Dr. James Veitch, Dr.
John Weir, Sir Henry Halford, and Dr. Thomas Monro.
But was medical therapy to be aimed at the mental disorder itself, or only at
bodily conditions accompanying it? Thomas Bakewell, a non-medical proprietor of
a much-respected private madhouse in Staffordshire, told the committee. "I do not
look upon medicine as of great importance for the mental disease; but there are
bodily complaints connected with it, requiring the application of medicine.""
Edward Wakefield, a Quaker land agent who was active in exposing the abuses at
the York Asylum, Bethlem, and other asylums, was even more definite about the
place ofmedicine in the care ofthe insane. Asked whether medical men ought to be
"Inspectors and Comptrollers of Madhouses", he replied, "I think they are the
most unfit ofany class ofpersons. In the first place, from every enquiry I have made,
I am satisfied that medicine has little or no effect upon the disease, and the only
reason for their selection, is the confidence which is placed in their being able to
apply a remedy to the malady."35 Wakefield's attitudes had been coloured by the
unfavourable contrast betweenthemedically-orientated YorkAsylumandthe Retreat,
where "there are Quakers who are neither medical men or ofany Professional class,
who are conspicuous for the extraordinary treatment of Insane persons, by the
attention and kindness which they pay to them".
It is of interest that in 1816 Wakefield retracted his statements concerning the
impotence ofmedical therapy in the treatment ofthe insane. Between 1815 and 1816
he had discovered a madhouse which conformed to his warmest expectations on how
the insane should be most effectively and humanely treated. This was Laverstock
House, near Salisbury, run by a surgeon named William Finch. Finch shared the
confidence ofthe majority ofhis medical colleagues in the efficacy ofmedical therapy
in cases of insanity, and his success convinced Wakefield that insanity is a disease
"which in its incipient state is capable of relief from medicine. . . I examined the
register ofthe many cases which had come under[Finch's] care, and he has completely
proved to my satisfaction, that medical treatment is ofthe greatest consequence."36
Wakefield was an important convert for the medical men, since the reforming
activities of laymen like him, William Tuke, and Godfrey Higgins represented a
viable alternative to the medical model ofinsanity reflected in the medical literature
of the period. If laymen like the Tukes could operate a more effective asylum than
the doctors could, traditional therapeutic regimens and theories ofinsanity were both
jeopardized. The medical witnesses which the Committee examined unanimously
expressed confidence in the unique role of doctors in the psychiatric situation.
They also spoke for the rest of their profession. Thus, George Man Burrows,
writing in 1828, praised the moral treatment of the York Retreat, but he "viewed
with regret the little confidence professed by the benevolent conductors . . . in . ..
the great efficacy ofmedicine in the majority of cases ofinsanity".37 Earlier, Andrew
Harper, even in developing a theory ofinsanity which was essentially mental, rather
than corporeal, expressed his regret that the treatment of insanity had fallen "too
326Rationalesfor therapy in British Psychiatry: 1780-1835
much into the hands ofmen who never possessed any great share ofphysical skill".8
Thomas Mayo, who later became President of the Royal College of Physicians,
lamented in the name of medicine what he conceived as a growing emphasis of
psychological aspects of insanity to the exclusion of the physical changes which
always accompanied it. Insanity, he wrote in 1817, is a "subject so interesting in its
nature, as almost to have been wrestled by the philosopher out of the hands of the
physician. To vindicate the rights of my profession over Insanity, and to elucidate
its medical treatment, are the objects at which I have aimed." He went on to point
out that hypochondriasis, for example, though at that time frequently referred to as
a mental disease, was treated in nosological works where it really belonged, as a
"disorder of the body".39
John Haslam was even more explicit in his 1817 Considerations on the moral
management of insane persons. Haslam in fact was one of the group specifically
criticized by Monro for emphasizing psychological features ofinsanity to the neglect
of physical ones. To the extent that he did, we tend to praise rather than censure.
Haslam's writings do contain astute psychological observations, but like Monro,
Haslam was in theory a physicalist. Haslam fully admitted that "management", as
he referred to what we are calling moral therapy, could be effective in contributing
to the cure of insanity, or at least (and this is an important qualification) to the
"comfort and happiness ofthe lunatic". But, he went on,
Oflate it has been seriously proposed, in a great deal to remove both the medical treatment and
moral management ofinsane persons from the care ofphysicians, and to transfer this important
and responsible department of medicine into the hands of magistrates and senators. For the
welfare ofthose afflicted persons, and for the security ofthe public, it is to be hoped that such
transfer may never be established; but that the medical and moral treatment ofthe insane may
continue to be directed by the medical practitioner, under the sanction and superintendency of
the College ofPhysicians. The concurring opinions ofall thinking persons allow insanity to be
a disease, and those best acquainted with this disorder are most persuaded of the relief to be
obtained by ajudicious administration ofmedicine.4
Even in admitting the importance of "management", as opposed to active medical
therapy, Haslam insisted on the absolute right of a medical man to take complete
charge ofthe care ofthe insane. His comments were obviously directed in part at the
York Retreat; but of course any non-medical keeper of a private madhouse might
consider himself implicated. Additionally, the investigations of the Parliamentary
Select Committee of 1815 and 1816 were still much on Haslam's mind in 1817. One
ofthe features which had emerged from these proceedings was that there was simply
no agreement among medical men about the actual details of medical therapy.
Haslam and his chief, Thomas Monro, had disagreed on the value of emetics in the
treatment of insanity. The third medical officer to Bethlem, the recently-deceased
surgeon Bryan Crowther,41 had also mentioned in his 1811 book on insanity various
routine medical procedures (such as a spring blood-letting) performed on virtually
all the Bethlem patients, regardless of their complaints or general condition.'2 Such
indiscriminate therapy was hard tojustify, especially in the light ofmoral treatment,
for one of its most important features, stressed by both Pinel and Tuke, was that
moral therapy was individually tailored to the needs and capacities of the patient.
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Psychological causation is by definition a highly individual matter, and moral therapy
required the therapist to know his patient far more intimately than most medically-
oriented physicians apparently ever bothered to do.
Medical men could thus neither agree on the specifics of medical therapy; nor
could they defend the rigid and indiscriminate therapeutic patterns which sometimes
obtained in places like Bethlem. Indeed, when pressed, they could sometimes show a
remarkable lack ofconfidence in all forms ofmedical therapyforthe insane. Thomas
Monro once admitted to the Select Committee that management was probably
far more efficacious than medicine, that as a matter of fact, the medical measures
probably did notdo any good. Later, however, heexplicitly insisted that his statement
should not be construed to mean that he thought medical therapy dispensable.
Like the books ofPinel andTuke, then, the Select Committee's investigations made
moral therapy seem more efficacious and more humane at the expense of medical
therapy. Haslam's comments must be read in the light of the committee's investi-
gations, for he more than any other individual felt the full brunt ofthe public outcry
at the appalling conditions in certain public and private institutions devoted to the
insane. Crowther had diedjust before the committee opened its hearings. Monro was
allowed to "retire", but his son was immediately appointed physician to Bethlem,
thus assuring the Monro association with the venerable institution for many years to
come. Haslam, on the other hand, was dismissed without a pension after more than
twenty years' service. He was then fifty-six years old and probably knew more about
mental disorders than any other person in Britain."3
With Crowther dead, Monro in retirement, and Haslam and most of the keepers
dismissed, the staff at Bethlem almost completely changed in the space ofonly three
years. The institutional policies changed but little, however, and actual reform had
to wait until mid-century. The comments ofa relatively new staffmember at Bethlem
give a gloss on the situation there after the Select Committee had adjourned. These
were by William Lawrence, Crowther's successor as surgeon to Bethlem. Appointed
just before the Select Committee opened its investigations, Lawrence survived the
public outcry of that earlier occasion only to have a public indignation of a slightly
different sort two yearslaterthreaten hisposition at Bethlem, as well as at Bridewell's,
and St. Bartholomew's." Lawrence's views on moral therapy, and his stated reasons
for holding them, lay at the heart of the matter. Believing that the mind is the
function of the brain, he found it difficult to conceive that insanity is other than a
primary disease of the brain, secondarily disturbing its functions (i.e. mental pro-
cesses). "The effect of medical treatment [he went on] completely corroborates
these views. Indeed they who talk of and believe in diseases of the mind, are too
wise to put their trust in mental remedies. Arguments, syllogisms, discourses,
sermons, have never yet restored any patient; the moral pharmacopoeia is quite
inefficient, and no real benefit can be conferred without vigorous medical treatment,
which is as efficacious in these affections, as in the disease of any other organ."45
These remarks may tell us more about the state ofLawrence's mind, when they were
delivered in 1818 than about the real debate on moral therapy, but they show that
one member of Bethlem's "new" staff still had more sympathy for the traditional
modes oftreating insanity.
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Lawrence's words remind us that there are two diametrically opposed reasons why
apersonduringthisperiodmight believe thatpsychiatric disorders areprimarydiseases
of the brain. If one held to the theological identity of mind and soul, then, as we
have seen, such a beliefprotected the mind as an ontological entity from the ravages
of disease, decay, and mutability. On the other hand, if one held that the mind is
the function of the brain, totally dependent on that organ, and that all mental func-
tions result from, or at least are accompanied by, physiological processes, then
mental derangements might naturally be thought to have a corresponding structural
malformation orderangement. Thus wefind Lawrence, widely accused ofmaterialism,
holding similar views on the subject of insanity with William Newnham, writing in
the Christian Observer for 1829. Newnham explicitly pointed to the theological
implications entailed in ascribing disease to the mind: "A great error has arisen, and
has been perpetuated even to the present day, in considering cerebral disorder as
mental; requiring, and indeed admitting, only of moral remedies, instead of these
forming only one class of curative agents; whereas the brain is the mere organ of
mind, not the mind itself; and its disorder offunction arises from its ceasing to be a
proper medium for the manifestation ofthe varied action and passion ofthepresiding
spirit."46 Like Lawrence, but for opposing reasons, Newnham believed that insanity
is always brain disease.
Theviewthatmentalderangement isalwaysaccompanied byphysical derangements
of some sort was of course not the only position to take on the subject. Among
British physicians of the early nineteenth century, however, it was a most widely
held opinion, and this despite persuasive counter-evidence. For almost all of them
admitted that no convincing anatomico-pathological analysis could always be
performed in cases of insanity. There were two aspects to this breakdown between
the clinical and pathological correlations. In the first place, no consistent lesion could
be found in the brains or skulls oflunatics examined by post-mortem. Certain kinds
of lesions seemed to crop up with regularity, evidences of vascular congestion and
general cerebral inflammation, thickening of the skull, and so forth, but there was
basic agreement that lunatics frequently died at the height of an attack without
having any evidence ofpathological changes inside their skulls. In the second place,
thewhole range ofchanges most often found at post-mortem examinations oflunatics
could easily be demonstrated in the brains of persons dying with full possession of
their faculties. There was thus no concrete reason to believe thatpsychiatric disorders
are actually brain diseases, and this very lack of post-mortem correlation was taken
by some as good evidence that the mind is an immaterial essence not ever primarily
affected with disease. But as we have noted, that beliefitselffurnished strong motiva-
tion for throwing the lesions ofinsanity on to the brain. Other factors besides con-
vincing empirical evidence led British physicians to their belief that insanity is
fundamentally a physical condition. Several of these factors have already been
alluded to: theconflation ofthe concepts ofmind and soul, the inheritance ofphysical
explanations from antiquity, the lay threat to medical control of the insane implicit
in the milieu of moral therapy and early nineteenth-century institutional reform. In
addition to Mayo, Lawrence, Newnham, Haslam, and Monro, other medical men
who explicitly subscribed to the physical model of mental illness during the period
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included Andrew Marshal, George Nesse Hill, David Uwins, Joseph Mason Cox,
George Man Burrows, W. A. F. Browne, James Cowles Prichard, Andrew Combe,
Sir William Ellis, Francis Willis, and John Conolly. This is a heterogeneous group,
united, however, by the proposition that insanity is a condition caused by physical
changes and consequently within the reach of medical therapy. Francis Willis, for
example, told his audience at the College ofPhysicians' Gulstonian Lectures of 1822
that: "We must lament, it should ever be gravely pronounced from the lips of any
medical experience, that 'medicine is of no use in the disorders of the mind;' an
opinion highly detrimental to the practice of Physic, and its ulterior happy results!
Yet I remember to have heard formerly at a lecture, that furor uterinus was a disease
exclusively of the mind, and on that account incurable."47 Willis's therapeutic opti-
mism about the "happy results" of medical therapy was part of his justification for
keeping insanity within the scope of medical theory and practice.
Nevertheless, some dissension existed even within the medical community as a
few doctors toyed with the proposition that insanity is always a disease of the mind.
In 1789 Andrew Harper in his Treatise on the real cause and cure of insanity had
announced that insanity is a primary disease ofmind, "independent and exclusive of
every corporeal, sympathetic, direct, or indirect excitement, or irritation whatever".
Harper thus separated "true insanity" from melancholia and dementia, assumed by
him to be purely corporeal diseases. His reasons for coming to this position were
hazy, his language confused, and his therapy did not consistently follow from his
theoretical pronouncements. He has been seen as a true psychiatric pioneer for his
emphasis on the mental nature of insanity, but his influence during our period was
very slim.
A more challenging position was put forward by William Saunders Hallaran, in a
book published in 1810. Hallaran suggested that the sensorial changes taking place
in insanity may be due to strictly mental causes, or to physical causes. He thus dis-
tinguished "mental insanity" from bodily disease mimicking mental insanity in its
symptoms. The importance ofidentifying the conditions properly lay in the differing
therapeutic regimens required for each. Mental insanity could be cured by moral
therapy;whereas medicaltherapywasrequired in the cases ofbodilydisease. Hallaran
thus took moral therapy at its face value and used it to support his theoretical
structures.'8
I have outlined above three major positions which can be found in the British
psychiatric literature of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries: (1) that
insanity is always attended by structural changes and hence is ultimately a physical
condition; (2) that insanity is always a mental condition, properly differentiated from
any physical disease which secondarily produces mental symptoms; (3) that insanity
may be caused by either physical disease or by mental aberrations. The vast majority
of British physicians who expressed themselves on the subject ofinsanity during our
period subscribed themselves to the first position, that insanity is a disease of the
body. Many of them also supported the increased application of moral therapy.
How did they reconcile psychological treatment for physical disease? One way of
course was by neglecting to examine the issues very closely and merely accepting
moral therapy on a pragmatic basis. Another was by distinguishing (as did Haslam)
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between the value ofmoral therapy in making patients more malleable and easier to
deal with, and its ultimate use in a direct therapeutic sense.
Both of these approaches were essentially negative, but there was a third, more
positive rationale for moral therapy which applies to several of the list of sixteen
physicalists mentioned above. This concerns Gall's phrenology. It is significant that
four ofthese physicians most keenly interested in moral therapy were phrenologists:
Sir William Ellis, Andrew Combe, John Conolly, and W. A. F. Browne. Ellis is
remembered for his work with occupational therapy; Browne for his judicious use
of moral therapy first at the Montrose Lunatic Asylum, and later as superintendent
ofthe Royal Crichton Asylum. Conolly, ofcourse, is famous for his introduction of
the no-restraint system at Hanwell, in Middlesex.'9 The phrenological concept of
mental functions circumvented the traditional Cartesian framework and permitted
phrenologists to refer simultaneously to the experienced mental state and its under-
lying physiological counterpart. The effectiveness of moral therapy could be under-
stood both in terms ofpsychological benefit and the concomitant hypertrophy ofthe
stimulated areas ofthe cerebral cortex.50
The peculiar features ofphrenological doctrine give an underlying coherence to the
activities of various phrenologically inclined psychiatrists. Moral therapy was no
phrenological monopoly, however.5' Many medical superintendents and consultant
physicians ofthe growing numbers ofcounty lunatic asylums and private madhouses
adopted therapeutic programmes which relied heavily on management. Increasingly,
too, psycho-social aspects of insanity were emphasized in discussions of aetiology.
In the first few decades ofthe nineteenth century, however, there was no widespread
abandonment ofthe more strictly medical aspects ofpsychiatric therapy. Psychiatrists
remained what William James once called "medical materialists'.52 Insanity con-
tinued to be conceived as a physical disease potentially within the reach ofmedicinal
agents. There was no great movement towards the lay treatment ofthe insane along
the lines of the York Retreat. In fact, the lay reformers who played major roles in
the events leading up to the parliamentary investigation of 1815 and 1816 seemed
content to allow medical men to retain their central position in the care ofthe insane.
Doctors in turn responded with an exuberant confidence in their capacities to cure a
highproportion oftheinsanewho cameundertheirministrations in theearlystages of
thedisease. Some evenclaimed acurerateashighasninetypercentunderappropriate
circumstances.53
In any case, the decades immediately following the parliamentary investigation
represent for British psychiatry a period of therapeutic optimism, an optimism
founded in part on a concerted medical attempt to retain control of psychiatric
institutions and their patients. Both lay reformers and medical men were anxious that
insanity be recognized as a disease and that the insane be placed in hospitals and
asylums rather than gaols and workhouses. The motives of laymen like Edward
Wakefield and William Tuke were essentially humanitarian. The motives of the
medical men were much more complicated. Professional, social, and economic con-
siderations coloured their ownjudgments and tempered the enthusiasm they showed
towards moral therapy. They were prepared to adopt many of the features of the
York Retreat into their own therapeutic programmes. They were not prepared to
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jettison their medical models of insanity, nor were they willing to compromise their
central roles in the diagnosis and treatment of the mentally ill. They were successful
in establishing the medical speciality of psychiatry. Nevertheless, their psychiatric
descendants still face many of the same problems, as evidenced by contemporary
debates on the nature of mental disease, the status of lay psycho-analysis, or the
amount of general medical education necessary for one who intends to specialize in
the management ofdiseases ofthe mind.
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